



LISHIELD: AUTOMATING VISUAL PRIVACY PROTECTION USING A SMART LED



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VISUAL PRIVACY PROTECTION IS URGENT



We don't want to be photographed!

PASSIVE PHYSICAL OBJECTS

A MALE SECURITY GUARD USES STORE surveillance cameras to zoom in on the cleavage of an unsuspecting jockstrap, is one plaintiff in a pending lawsuit against the company for invasion of privacy. "I worked real hard for them and

EXISTING RUDIMENTARY APPROACHES



LISHIELD SYSTEM OVERVIEW

- **Corruption:** block illegal camera users
- **Authorization:** unblock legal camera users
- **Watermarking:** conveying 'no distribution' message



AUTHORIZATION

Only allow Mom
to take picture



PICTURE TAKEN BY MOM

AUTHORIZATION



PICTURE TAKEN BY OTHER PEOPLE



Upload fail.
Image is
confidential



CAMERA: ROLLING SHUTTER




Intensity

Normal indoor lights

Exposure

Time



ROLLING SHUTTER + LIGHT WAVEFORM



Intensity

LED waveform



Exposure


Time




Black-white waveform




RGB waveform



CHALLENGE #1: WAVEFORM IS TRANSPARENT TO HUMAN EYES



$f > 100\text{Hz}$



PERCEIVED BY HUMAN EYES

Time

CHALLENGE #2: ROBUSTNESS AGAINST CAMERA MANIPULATION




Intensity

LED waveform

Exposure

Time



$$T(\text{wave}) = T(\text{exp})$$

Stripe pattern under different exposure times




Figure 1: (a)-(b) Bright, dark and transitional stripes and their width changing with exposure time; (c)-(f) Stripe pattern of image changes under different exposure times.

Decomposing the image

For convenience, denote the period of the light source as $t_l = t_{\text{on}} + t_{\text{off}}$, and duty cycle as $D_c = t_{\text{on}}/t_l$. For pixel j in row i which starts exposure at time t_i , its light accumulation would be:

$$Q(i, j) = \alpha_{i, j} \int_{t_i}^{t_i + t_e} \pi_l(\tau) d\tau \quad (1)$$

where $\alpha_{i, j}$ is the aggregated path-loss for pixel (i, j) , including attenuation and reflection on the photographed object, and $\pi_l(\tau)$ represents the illumination waveform of the LED:

$$\pi_l(\tau) = \begin{cases} I_p, & 0 < \tau \bmod t_l \leq t_{\text{on}} \\ 0, & t_{\text{on}} < \tau \bmod t_l \leq t_l \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Decomposing the image

$$Q_B(i, j) = \begin{cases} \alpha_{i,j} I_p(N t_{\text{on}} + t_{\text{rem}}), & 0 < t_{\text{rem}} \leq t_{\text{on}} \\ \alpha_{i,j} I_p(N + 1) t_{\text{on}}, & t_{\text{on}} < t_{\text{rem}} \leq t_l \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

$$W_B = |t_{\text{rem}} - t_{\text{on}}| / t_s \quad (4)$$

$$Q_D(i, j) = \begin{cases} \alpha_{i,j} I_p N t_{\text{on}}, & 0 < t_{\text{rem}} \leq t_{\text{off}} \\ \alpha_{i,j} I_p(N t_{\text{on}} + t_{\text{rem}} - t_{\text{off}}), & t_{\text{off}} < t_{\text{rem}} \leq t_l \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

$$W_D = |t_{\text{rem}} - t_{\text{off}}| / t_s \quad (6)$$

Optimizing the LED waveform




Figure 2: PSNR and SSIM with respect to exposure time, LED intensity, duty cycle, and modulation frequency.

Optimizing the LED waveform




Figure 2: PSNR and SSIM with respect to exposure time, LED intensity, duty cycle, and modulation frequency.

1. A single frequency cannot ensure robust protection.
2. LiShield should prevent attackers from using long exposures.
3. LiShield should keep a high peak intensity to expand the overexposure zone.
4. Duty level should be kept at a modulate level.

Frequency scrambling




Figure 3: Decomposition of frequency randomization waveform and modulation generating side lobes.

$$f_n = f_B + (n - 1)\Delta f, n \in 2, 3, \dots, M,$$

CHALLENGE #2: ROBUSTNESS AGAINST CAMERA MANIPULATION




Intensity

LED waveform



Exposure

Time



$$T(\text{wave}) \neq T(\text{exp})$$

CHALLENGE #3: ROBUSTNESS AGAINST MULTI-FRAME RECOVERY



LED WAVEFORM

Illumination Intensity Randomization

uncorrelated after the randomization. Then the probability that one row gets any illumination is $p = t_{\text{on}} / (t_{\text{on}} + t_{\text{off}}) = D_c$. Observe that on average same intensities would reappear approximately every K frames, the possibility of combining L frames to fully recover an image of the static scene is thus:

$$P_{\text{rec}} = \begin{cases} \left[1 - (1 - D_c)^{L/K} \right]^m & \text{(monochrome)} \\ \left[1 - (1 - D_c)^{L/K} \right]^{3m} & \text{(RGB)} \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

Therefore, achieving a given level of P_{rec} becomes increasingly difficult as D_c and K increases, and for higher camera resolution (larger m). For example, to have $P_{\text{rec}} = 90\%$ for $D_c = 0.5$ and $m = 2448$ for 8-mega-pixel cameras, the attacker needs $L = 300$ frames under $K = 10$, and ~ 3000 frames under $K = 100$. For lower duty cycles,

CAMERA AUTHORIZATION

CAMERA CAN RECOVER IMAGES
GIVEN THE LED WAVEFORM



LiShield




Challenge: How to unblock one person while keep blocking the others?

LED WAVEFORM





Authorized User

Attacker



FRAME





Upload fail.
Image is
confidential

Sometimes sunlight coming inside from windows,
LED can have little influence on image quality.

What should we do?



WATERMARKING

WATERMARK ENCODER



Intensity

Affected by scene and ambient light noise



Vary with camera exposure




Duty Cycle

Ratio of two stripe frequencies



Frequency

Vary with camera sampling rate




IMPLEMENTATION

- LED can generate OOK waveform specified by LiShield's image corruption and watermarking modules
- Authorization is implemented on Android

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

- Various privacy-sensitive objects
- Metrics: PSNR, CW-SSIM, CIEDE2000




RESULT #1: QUALITY DEGRADATION

PSNR = 6 dB (>25 dB required)

CW-SSIM = 0.3 (>0.9 required)

CIEDE2000 = 35 (<4 required)



RESULT #2: CAMERA AUTHORIZATION



Unprotected




Authorized



Attacker

Authorized users get a high-quality image/video while we still block attackers

RESULT #3: WATERMARKING



False alarm rate $< 5\%$
Average detection rate $> 90\%$

RESULT #4: ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ATTACKS AND ENVIRONMENTS


LiShield is robust against camera manipulation and multi-frame recovery

LiShield is robust against post-capture repairing algorithms

LiShield is robust against normal ambient lights

LiShield is robust against long distance using multiple LEDs

RESULT #5: SIDE BENEFITS



Color stripes destroy automatic white balance



Dynamic scene reduces space of exposure manipulation

CONCLUSION

- LiShield is a **cost-effective**, **automatic**, and **easy-to-setup** system enabling privacy protection against illegal cameras
- We design an **authorization scheme** to unblock specific user
- **Watermarking** adds 'no distribution' message recognizable by online servers



Fast setup



Low cost



Effective protection

我的看法

优点:

如何提高系统的干扰程度: 细致的理论推导与仿真实验

限制:

对Global shutter camera无效